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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found Patrick Oar guilty of both conspiracy to commit grand theft by extortion,
and of grand theft by extortion. In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Oar asserted that there was
insufficient evidence to support his grand theft by extortion conviction because his actions did
not “compel,” “induce,” or “cause” the victim, M.D., to deliver the money; rather, she delivered
the money at the direction of a police detective.1
In response, the State appears to argue that M.D.’s subjective motivation in delivering the
money is not an element of grand theft by extortion, and that the jury heard sufficient evidence to
sustain the conviction based solely on the fact that M.D. delivered the money after a threat was
made. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.5-14.) The State’s arguments are not supported by the plain
language of the statute at issue, the out-of-state authority the State cites in support of its claims,
or the evidence presented in this case.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in Mr. Oar’s
Appellant’s Brief. They are not repeated in this Reply Brief but are incorporated herein by
reference.
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In addition, Mr. Oar asserted that his sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating factors that
exist in his case. The State’s argument on this issue is unremarkable and is not addressed in this
Reply Brief.
1

ISSUE
Should this Court vacate Mr. Oar’s conviction for grand theft by extortion as there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction?
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ARGUMENT
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Oar’s Conviction For Grand Theft By Extortion As There Was
Insufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction
The State acknowledges that after Ms. Blake contacted M.D. and asked her for the money
she owed Omar, M.D. “contacted law enforcement, who provided her with marked currency and
directed her to transfer the money while recording the conversation with a wire.” (Respondent’s
Brief, p.2.) Nevertheless, the State argues that “there was ample evidence that Oar’s wrongful
threat compelled on induced M.D. to deliver the money.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.5.) The State’s
argument is based upon multiple flawed premises, each of which is addressed below.
A.

A Conviction Under Idaho Code § 18-2403(2)(e)(1) Requires The State To Prove The
Alleged Victim Delivered Property Because Of The Fear Induced By The Defendant
Threat Of Harm
The State makes the following assertion:
The plain text of Idaho’s extortion statute does not require the state prove any
particular mental state or subjective motivation on the part of the extorted victim;
rather, the state was simply required to prove that the fear-instilling threat
compelled or induced the victim to turn over money to Oar’s accomplice.

(Respondent’s Brief, pp.10-11 (citing I.C. § 18-2403).) The State appears to argue that Idaho’s
grand theft by extortion statute does not require proof that the fear instilled by the “fear-instilling
threat” was the reason why the alleged victim delivered the money. A plain reading of the
statute reveals such an interpretation to be incorrect.
When interpreting statues, the Idaho legislature has directed:
(1) The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary
meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the
legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory construction. The
literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent.
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I.C. § 73-113; see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892893 (2011) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 18-2403(2)(e)(1) reads in relevant part as follows:
(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's
property, with the intent prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed in
any of the following ways:
(e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or
induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third
person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered,
the actor or another will:
1. Cause physical injury to some person in the future …
I.C. § 18-2403(2)(e)(1) (emphasis added). Grand theft by extortion, as described in section (e),
has three basic requirements: 1) a cause (“compels or induces”); 2) the method of causation (“by
means of instilling in him a fear”); and, an effect (“another person to deliver such property”).
The State’s proffered interpretation would eliminate the method of causation requirement.
Rather than being based upon the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the words actually
contained in the statute, the State’s interpretation seeks to eliminate an essential element of the
crime.
The out-of-state authority the State’s relies upon does not support its conclusion. In
State v. Marsh, 603 P.2d 1212 (Or. App. 1979), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the jury
could have inferred the victim in that case was compelled to deliver money because of the fear
he felt due to a bomb threat made by the defendant, despite the fact he was also directed by the
police to deliver the money. Id. at 1214-1215. In State v. Prince, 284, P. 108 (Utah 1930), the
Supreme Court of Utah found there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the
fear induced by the defendant’s threat, and not the desire to entrap the defendant at the
suggestion of the county attorney, was the “controlling factor” in the victim delivering the
money Id. at 110. These cases do not support the State’s assertion that “Idaho’s extortion statute
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does not require the state prove any particulate mental state or subjective motivation on the part
of the extorted victim.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.11.) These cases, to the extent they are relevant
at all, support the opposite conclusion.
The State further argues that “there was substantial evidence here that the victim agreed
to pay her debt due to the fear instilled in her by the threat.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.12.)
Relying upon the victim’s testimony that she was frightened by Ms. Blake approaching her and
requesting the money on Omar’s behalf, the State asserts “there is substantial evidence that Oar’s
threat was the ‘actuating motivation’ for the victim to contact the police and ultimately give the
money to Oar’s accomplice,” reasoning that she would not have reached out to law enforcement
absent the threat.

(Respondent’s Brief, pp.11-13.) The State’s argument is based upon a

misapprehension of the law and, in effect, is a recognition that the evidence does not support
Mr. Oar’s conviction for grand theft by extortion. In essence, the State concedes that the threat
did not compel or induce M.D. to turn over the money; rather, the threat compelled or induced
her to contact Detective Bruner. M.D. wore a wire and turned over the marked currency because
Detective Bruner told her to do so, not because of Ms. Blake’s threatening behavior.
The remainder of the State’s specific arguments are unremarkable and are not addressed
herein.

The State’s conclusion that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict finding

Mr. Oar guilty of grand theft by extortion is without merit.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Oar respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for grand theft by
extortion, and to remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2016.

___/S/______________________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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